Three Policy Directions
President Vladimir Putin’s increasingly problematic position in the war with Ukraine would seem to lead Russia in three possible directions: stay the course and keep throwing soldiers and missiles at Ukraine; accept a cease-fire and enter peace talks; or embark on a high-risk provocation strategy designed to cause divisions in NATO. The first direction is clearly a dead end; Russia is experiencing heavy losses at the front and at home without commensurate territorial gains. Far from giving up, Ukraine believes its drone warfare has put Russia on the defensive. With strong backing from NATO’s European members, Ukraine’s President Voloydmyr Zelensky sees prospects for a Ukrainian victory. Meantime, Ukraine’s drone attacks in Russia are reportedly causing considerable anxiety in the population and perhaps in the political elite. Oil production and revenue have dropped sharply as massive drone strikes take their toll. Crimea, which Russia seized in 2014, is in danger of being cut off from Russia. Even Trump has been moved to compliment Zelensky, saying “he’s doing pretty well. You have to say he’s courageous, he’s got great equipment, he’s got great men, he’s got fighters.” In a surprising vote of confidence in Ukraine, the US will grant Ukraine a license to produce Patriot interceptors for air defense.
Putin seems not to have anticipated Ukraine’s drone capability, but recent large-scale Russian ballistic missile and drone strikes on Ukraine’s cities show that he is far from giving up. The New York Times reports this typical reaction from a former Ukraine senior finance official: “There is a state of total uncertainty. There is a feeling that there is no good end to this in sight.” Indeed there isn’t, if reports from Moscow by Reuters are accurate. They cite Russians who are convinced Putin will double down on a military solution in Ukraine—more recruiting, more missile and drone attacks on the major cities. But that’s not a winning strategy.
Peace is Out of the Question
Peace talks, the second option, are equally unappealing, especially as the Trump administration has seemed to be moving away from Putin and toward Zelensky. Russian sources were once claiming that the Alaska meeting between Putin and Trump had led to an understanding that the US was on Russia’s side and it was up to Ukraine to enter talks. Now those same Russians have dropped the claim, with Putin acknowledging that Trump was not going to drag Ukraine into talks against its will. Some Russians even contend, as foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has said, that the Alaska summit was actually “a [US] ploy to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime” (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/30/war-stalls-putin-concedes-he-never-cut-deal-with-trump-alaska/).
Zelensky and Trump evidently had a positive meeting on the sidelines of the recent NATO conference in Ankara. Zelensky thanked Trump for his support of Ukraine’s air defense and “spoke about some ideas that could strengthen our positions and bring peace closer.” One such idea in the works in Congress is bipartisan legislation that would give the president authority to impose tariffs and sanctions on countries that continue purchasing Russian energy. China and India are foremost in mind. Putin has to be watching these developments with considerable unease.
A Russian Provocation Strategy?
Europeans and US intelligence are reported to be most concerned about the third option: a Russian provocation strategy. The logic of that strategy is to provoke a response from the target country that falls short of war. The provocation is limited in force and disguised so as to make the provocateur’s intentions unclear. The aim of the strategy is to cause division in the adversary’s ranks—in this case, among Ukraine’s NATO partners. Should they respond to the provocation, and if so, how? What are the risks of a general war if they do respond?
Poland is being talked about in NATO circles as the most likely Russian target for a provocation, since it borders on the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus. That gives Putin several options: a small troop incursion to test Poland’s response; a drone attack on an electrical or communications structure; a simulated air strike. According to US intelligence, which has warned Poland of possible Russian probes, Russia might want to force Poland to negotiate rather than retaliate with NATO’s support (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/07/03/russia-planning-attack-on-poland-test-nato-resolve-us-warns/).
Though a Russian provocation is not without risks, Putin might believe it is worth trying now that Russia cannot win the war either by military or political means—and with Trump preoccupied with Iran and the November elections. “I’d say escalatory risk is real, and growing—mostly because Putin is under growing pressure at home and losing on the battlefield,” said former CIA director William Burns (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/06/poland-baltics-brace-russian-military-test-nato/). What would stop Putin from trying? How about a strong deterrent statement from the US President that warns Putin that the US has the backs of Poland and all other NATO members if any one of them is attacked? Trump has never fully committed to NATO’s collective security pledge: an attack on one is an attack on all. His latest support for Ukraine might not be strong enough to dissuade Putin from taking a gamble in a desperate attempt to turn the tide.
In the Human Interest - Mel Gurtov 