Understanding the MOU
Most of the critical commentary on the Trump administration’s memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iran centers on the specific commitments each side is supposed to have made and intends to carry out. But the MOU is not a peace agreement; it is a framework for a potential agreement. Therein lies one of its central problems: the actual terms of a contractual arrangement between the US and Iran governments are matters for future negotiations, whereas the only firm arrangement is for an opening of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran in return for an end to the US blockade of Iran’s ports. Even then, the opening is tentative; shipping remains dangerous as Iran has indicated dissatisfaction with the route through the Strait, while the US has not withdrawn its naval and air power from the Strait area. In short, nothing about the MOU is certain.
The “understandings” in the MOU are matters of interpretation. Whether or not they lead to a signed agreement depends on how each party assesses the behavior of the other in fulfilling its presumed commitments. Leaders in both countries have expressed doubts about the credibility and reliability of the other—Trump about Iran’s willingness to carry out the MOU’s terms, in which case he has threatened to resume warfare, and Iran about US intentions with regard to its nuclear program and US ties to Israel. Mutual trust is absent, but more to the point is clarity about each party’s compliance with the agreement’s terms.
Obama’s Way
Two other problematic pieces to the US-Iran talks are the absence of involvement by other interested parties and lack of US expertise in the talks—both very different from what took place in 2015 when the US reached a nuclear deal with Iran under President Obama. The 2015 nuclear deal, let’s recall, was not just a US-Iran deal. China, Russia, Germany, France, Britain, and the European Union (“5P+1”) were also parties, creating a broader responsibility for the process and outcome. Moreover, whereas in 2015 the US team had considerable scientific representation on nuclear matters, as did Iran, these days the US is represented by political figures of (to be kind) questionable experience at dealing with nuclear affairs, to say nothing of Middle East history and politics.
Which brings me to the other, more basic reasons the 2015 talks succeeded where the current talks will probably not. In a case study of the 2015 talks for my book, Engaging Adversaries. I found that in the years prior to the nuclear deal, the Obama administration struggled to find a way forward, sometimes relying on threats and sometimes on engagement. Eventually, Obama chose the latter course, partly on the advice of outside specialists. Among the lessons learned from reaching agreement with Iran was that mutual respect works better than threats, that an appreciation of Iran’s history and culture goes a long way, that understanding Iran’s interests is important, and that US negotiators needed to avoid hostile rhetoric and grandstanding and instead be businesslike and professional.
Absent these conditions today, and Iran’s fundamental mistrust of the US stemming from the Trump administration’s rejection of the 2015 deal, a settlement of the war seems remote. Even if military action does not resume, it is hard to imagine that Trump will match Obama’s achievements: a reduction of Iran’s uranium enrichment, an easing of sanctions, Iran’s commitment to rigorous international inspections, a return to Iran of frozen assets, and support of the agreement by the 5P+1 countries.
The Art of a Real Deal
In an interview on MSNow the other day, former US secretary of state, John Kerry, discussed the MOU and compared it with the 2015 deal that he and his team concluded. He emphasized the point I just made that the MOU is merely a promise to negotiate, with results that are unpredictable. What Trump should have done is this, said Kerry: “All the president had to do was commit that he was prepared to negotiate for the changes that he really wanted as a result of Iran’s behavior. There was no effort to put on the table something that said, look, here’s what we really object to. These are the problems that we have with the current agreement [meaning the 2015 deal] and we’re prepared to negotiate with you on that. That is a negotiation that never took place.” Why didn’t Trump do that? Kerry, like many observers, believes it comes down to two things: the influence of Netanyahu and Trump’s determination to outdo Obama.
Trump has made very clear in (for example) his dealings with Venezuela, Cuba, Canada, and Denmark that when he thinks an adversary is weak, he will downplay diplomacy and foreign policy expertise and seek advantage by force or threat. With Iran, Trump early on sought regime change, boasted about a quick end to the war, urged Iran’s people to rise up, and constantly resorted to threats if he believed Iran would not be forthcoming. There was no “art of the deal,” merely bluster, overconfidence, and stupidity.
In the Human Interest - Mel Gurtov 
As Netanyahu’s influence in his own coalition becomes more fragile and the Ben Gvir-Smotrich wing attracts more public support from the Israeli public on the Lebanon issue, it is just not clear what dealing with Netanyahu can really hope to achieve particularly as Israeli elections approach and Netanyahu will need support from the Right.