North Korea is rattling America’s cage again. It sent a reminder call when it recently fired off multiple short-range missiles after denouncing Washington for going forward with joint military exercises with South Korea (https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/north-korea-missile-launch-biden/2021/03/23/9fabe478-8be3-11eb-a730-1b4ed9656258_story.html). A few days later the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the formal name for North Korea) launched two new tactical guided ballistic missiles, in defiance of a UN ban. Some experts say the ballistic missiles, which have a high degree of maneuverability, could potentially be fixed with nuclear or biological weapons and thus pose a new danger to South Korea (https://thebulletin.org/2021/04/north-koreas-tactical-guided-ballistic-missile-test-is-no-joke-for-biden-and-south-korea/).
My analysis is that the missile tests reflect North Korea’s impatience with the US to produce a negotiating position that isn’t a repeat of the usual US approach: you eliminate your nukes, then we’ll talk about rewards. The Biden administration reportedly has tried to contact Pyongyang about talks, but Kim Jong-un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo-jong, dismissed the idea, saying that if the Biden administration “wants to sleep in peace for the coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink.” The comment was widely interpreted here as a warning, but I contend her message was, “If you want to start talks, offer something different from sanctions, nuclear threats, and military exercises with South Korea.”
Whether or not the Biden team will respond with a new approach is uncertain. A North Korea policy review is reportedly underway, following consultations with South Korea and Japan. Meantime, here are 8 points that guide my many years of study of North Korea’s international perspective:
- The defining feature of the regime in dealing with all foreign powers, including allies like China, is militant nationalism. The regime will resist an imposed bargain.
- What the DPRK wants from the US is security assurances against regime change or attack, acknowledgment of the regime’s legitimacy, a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War, and economic incentives that would help prop up the economy (and the regime itself).
- Nuclear weapons are North Korea’s main bargaining card. The regime is not irrational; it wants those weapons to deter attack, not initiate attack. It is not about to give them up for short-term gain, and will probably never agree to destroy all of them.
- Sanctions against the North have failed and will continue to fail. There are too many loopholes, and Chinese businessmen are among many who have exploited them.
- Demanding denuclearization first will get nowhere. It should be the product of painstaking trust-building between the US and the DPRK.
- South Korea’s interests should be respected, and its efforts at bridge-building with the North should not be deflected by the US as happened under Trump.
- Summit meetings of the type Trump and Kim put on should be avoided; they are photo-ops, deceptively friendly, and no substitute for substantive, verifiable agreements.
- Despite North Korean dependence on China for food and fuel, China will not use its influence in support of US policy so long as the US-China relationship is in its present state of high tension and mistrust.
President Biden, at his first press conference March 25, said: “I’m also prepared for some form of diplomacy, but it has to be conditioned upon the end result of denuclearization.” That’s fine; if working-level talks with North Korea can reopen and a process leading to denuclearization can begin, the US should expect that the North will cease testing long-range ballistic missiles or carrying out another nuclear-weapon test. Economic sanctions can be eased gradually as North Korea refrains from making threats directed at the US or its allies, and as the vast repressive machinery of North Korea’s gulag lightens up.
In a recent speech, Kim Jong-un said the economy faces an “extremely difficult” situation, requiring officials to “wage another, more difficult Arduous March” (https://www.38north.org/2021/04/worst-ever-situation-or-not/). With the border with China closed because of the pandemic, Chinese food aid has dramatically declined, leaving it up to other countries to provide assistance. North Korea must reopen its borders to get food, medicine, and other aid, but that should only happen after nongovernmental groups (NGOs) have an opportunity to deliver aid without hindrance or diversion to the military. (For another view of steps the US and the DPRK take short of immediate denuclearization, see https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2021-03-25/it-time-realistic-bargain-north-korea.)
Let’s recall that back on 2005, all the major players—both Koreas, China, Russia, Japan, and the US—agreed to the formula of “action for action” to promote stability on the Korean peninsula. That means “peace by pieces,” positive reciprocal steps that stand a much better chance of succeeding than peace by punishment. US leaders, from George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” to Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” and Donald Trump’s love letters, haven’t tried that approach. I hope the Biden administration will operate differently.
Mel, your comments on North Korea are perceptive and and compelling. I suggest several additions. First, I think sanctions have not simply failed to produce the outcomes desired by the U.S. They have actually incentivized behaviors contrary to U.S. stated interests by making finding ways around and under the sanctions a nearly existential priority for the DPRK. This has undermined international diplomacy and is related to my second point. That is, the U.S. should negotiate sincerely with the DPRK. While ‘sincerity’ may initially seem a mushy concept incompatible with national security policy, I believe that a stance of sincerity is a necessary condition for the trust building we all desire. To my mind, exhibiting sincerity begins with opening traditional diplomatic channels and developing sustained relationships that permit real discussions of differing interests. This takes time and we have to hope that the new administration’s policy review not only leads to the kinds of policy changes you describe but that it also is concluded quickly enough that time consuming sincere negotiations are given sufficient time to bear fruit before the next presidential election season. Otherwise we will be left with some sort of miserable mix of ‘kicking the can down the road’, one-shot diplomatic overtures, and ‘strategic patience’. Finally, I know there will be those that say North Koreans will never negotiate sincerely and that what I suggest is foolish. My experience with North Koreans suggests otherwise. –Stu
This is a valuable contribution to the policy debate from someone with direct experience with North Koreans. Thanks, Stu; I entirely agree that trust building requires “building sustained relationships” and demonstrating sincerity in doing so.
In a sense the North Korean conundrum is simple, hard to resolve but transparent. “Sustain & guarantee our regime’s existence, remove US forces from the peninsula, and reconcile relations with the South.”
Take a page from Rutherford Hayes‘ administration & voila, problem postponed until 2150 AD.
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Mel, I was surprised that SK wasn’t more prominently mentioned in your 8 points. I would think the influence of South Korea, especially after the Korean Peninsula Rapprochement in Panmunjom (2018) would be seen to serve as an important constraint on NK’s aggressiveness, internationally. (That, of course, assumes a resumption of efforts to re-establish the Panmunjom understandings following destruction of the Liaison office in 2020 and in spite of periodic outcroppings of political opposition to trust-building in SK) . Do you disagree?https://ksr.hkspublications.org/2018/10/15/trust-building-between-north-korea-and-south-korea-and-its-implications/
The 2018 article came at a time when North-South relations were heading in a positive direction. Thanks in no small part to Trump, the honeymoon was brief, and by 2020 the administration was actively seeking to undermine Pres. Moon’s engagement efforts. Just as importantly, North Korean leaders have always believed that the road to security goes through Washington, not Seoul. You notice that whenever major pronouncements come out of Pyongyang, they’re directed at the US–like the comments of Kim’s sister mentioned in my blog. In essence, if the US embraces trust building, the ROK’s efforts will be meaningful and possibly, at some point, constraining. But that isn’t the case now.
Doubtless true that the preponderance of public comments from Pyongyang are addressed to the U.S. That doesn’t diminish the power and importance of ROK. The 2 Koreas engage in ongoing, unpublicized cyber exercises that have enormous implications for economic sustainability and security on the Peninsula . NK’s advanced offensive cyber capability, for instance, is being used to hack into international financial institutions (e.g. Bangladesh) to generate much needed funding for its core economy. ROK’s extensive defensive cyber program is focused on deterring NK’s intrusions. And its offensive operation is doubtless perceived as a viable threat to NK’s nuclear program. It may be that ROK’s influence is more robust than you would think.
I disagree. To the extent that aspect of the ROK’s “influence” is taken into account in N Korea, it is still evaluated by the N Koreans in the context of US policy toward the DPRK. Besides, the ROK’s counter-cyber efforts to date have evidently had little impact on N Korean hacking, sanction avoidance, gross human rights violations, or any other bad behavior.
Excellent summation as usual, to these non-expert eyes. To your knowledge, is anyone
at the State Department listening?
Thanks, Mike. If anyone is out there, they sure aren’t sayin’. Groupthink prevails.